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The emotional outcome of a choice affects subsequent decision making.While the relation-
ship between decisionmaking and emotion has attracted attention, studies on emotion and
decision making have been independently developed. In this study, we investigated how
the emotional valence of pictures, which was stochastically contingent on participants’
choices, inﬂuenced subsequent decision making. In contrast to traditional value-based
decision-making studies that used money or food as a reward, the “reward value” of the
decision outcome, which guided the update of value for each choice, is unknown before-
hand. To estimate the reward value of emotional pictures from participants’ choice data,
we used reinforcement learning models that have successfully been used in previous stud-
ies for modeling value-based decision making. Consequently, we found that the estimated
reward valuewas asymmetric between positive and negative pictures.The negative reward
value of negative pictures (relative to neutral pictures) was larger in magnitude than the
positive reward value of positive pictures. This asymmetry was not observed in valence
for an individual picture, which was rated by the participants regarding the emotion expe-
rienced upon viewing it. These results suggest that there may be a difference between
experienced emotion and the effect of the experienced emotion on subsequent behav-
ior. Our experimental and computational paradigm provides a novel way for quantifying
how and what aspects of emotional events affect human behavior. The present study is a
ﬁrst step toward relating a large amount of knowledge in emotion science and in taking
computational approaches to value-based decision making.
Keywords: decision making, emotional picture, value, reinforcement learning model
1. INTRODUCTION
The role of emotion indecisionmakinghas attracted the interest of
many researchers (Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003;
Cohen, 2005; Shiv et al., 2005; Seymour and Dolan, 2008). The
emotional state of a decision maker and the emotional outcome
of decision-making affect decision making. From this perspec-
tive, emotion science (or affective science) and decision science
should have a close relationship. However, studies on emotions
and decision making have been independently developed. Studies
on decision making have been developed in many ﬁelds, such as
behavioral economics, neuroscience, and the fusion of these disci-
plines, neuroeconomics. While emotion science attempts to study
a broad range of topics in emotion (De Gelder, 2010), researchers
in behavioral economics have mapped many factors in decision
making onto a single variable: value.
Studies on decision making (including those that address the
effect of emotion) have mainly used primary or secondary rein-
forcers (i.e., food for animals and money for humans) to form
values for the actions in decision makers. These reinforcers are
useful for manipulating values in a uniform way and reducing
individual variability. For humans, however, what affects deci-
sion making is not only food or monetary rewards. Speciﬁcally,
several aspects of an outcome, including the emotional content,
affect decision making. The emotional content is often difﬁcult
to quantify and exhibits a great deal of individual variability. For
example, the values of amovie ormusic are difﬁcult tomeasure and
can show large individual variability, as music inducing happiness
in some people could be just noise to others.
One goal of the present study was to propose a paradigm for
measuring the effect of an emotional event on human behav-
ior by inferring the “reward value” of a general emotional event
from choice data. One of the inﬂuential models of emotion is a
two-dimensional model consisting of valence (positive–negative)
and arousal (arousal–sleepiness; Russell, 1980; Russell and Bul-
lock, 1985; but see Fontaine et al., 2007). In the present study,
we focused on the former factor, valence, which is a primary
component of emotion. Thus, we investigate how the valence of
decision-making outcomes is mapped onto reward values in deci-
sion makers, thereby affecting subsequent behavior. To achieve
this, we use emotional images instead of monetary rewards in a
conventional stochastic reinforcement learning task. We hypothe-
sized that positive/negative reward valueswould be associatedwith
approaching/avoidance behaviors that would increase/decrease
the probability of actions upon which these reward values are
contingent. From this hypothesis, we can measure the “reward
value” of emotional stimuli from participants’ choice behaviors.
To evaluate the reward values from choice data, we employed a
computational model, which is a reinforcement learning model
www.frontiersin.org October 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 311 | 1
Katahira et al. Decision-making based on emotional images
that has successfully been applied to value-based decision-making
behavior in both human and animal studies (for reviews,Daw and
Doya, 2006; Corrado andDoya, 2007; O’Doherty et al., 2007). Our
participants rated the subjective valence of how they experienced
the valence of the picture. Our speciﬁc goal was to investigate the
relationship between the rated valence for emotional pictures and
the reward value of the pictures estimated from the choice data.
Possible results were (1) the distance between the rated subjec-
tive valence from the neutral pictures was preserved in reward
value, (2) the distance was ampliﬁed for either positive or negative
pictures or (3) only positive or negative pictures have non-zero
reward value (compared to neutral pictures). We construct the
reinforcement learning models that correspond to each possibility
and compare them by using the goodness of ﬁt to the participants’
choice data.
We used pictures adopted from the International Affective Pic-
ture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 1999), which have been commonly
used in emotion studies as the emotional images (e.g., Lang, 1995;
Bradley et al., 2001; Hariri et al., 2002; Cahill et al., 2003; Scherer
et al., 2006). In previous studies, the IAPS has primarily been
used for measuring reactions to emotional stimuli in behavioral,
physiological, and neural responses rather than for investigat-
ing the inﬂuence of emotional stimuli on subsequent behavior,
as we do in the present study. Thus, the present study is a ﬁrst
step toward linking the computational approach to value-based
decision making with emotion science that explores the emo-
tional reactions to emotional stimuli. As in previous reward-based
decision-making studies (e.g., Sugrue et al., 2004; Corrado et al.,
2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2005), we also examined how the past
history of emotional images inﬂuences current choices by using
linear ﬁlter (regression) analysis.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE
The participants were 22 healthy volunteers (10 females and
12 males) recruited at the Wako campus of RIKEN (Saitama,
Japan). All participants were native Japanese speakers and had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Three participants were
excluded from the analysis because they forget or misunder-
stood the instruction that pictures were contingent on previous
choices. Two additional participants were excluded because the
mean valence rating for the positive/negative pictures did not suf-
ﬁciently differ from the neutral rating (the departure from neutral
was less than 1, where the maximum was 4). Thus, the pictures
used were deemed to be ineffective positive and/or negative stim-
uli for these individuals. The 17 remaining participants (8 females
and 9males) had an average age of 36.5 years old (SD = 8.0, range:
28–51). The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST). Participants were
given detailed information and provided written consent.
TASK DESCRIPTION
The task consisted of 600 trials with short breaks after every 200
trials. Figure 1 outlines the ﬂow for one trial. Each trial began with
a black screen, the duration of which was sampled from a uniform
distribution between 0.5 and 1.0 s. Next, two colored (green and
blue) squares were presented, and participants were required to
FIGURE 1 | Schematic of one trial in the experiment. After the
presentation of a blank screen whose duration was drawn from a uniform
distribution between 0.5 and 1.0 s, a green square (target 1) and a blue
square (target 2) were presented for 1.0 s. Each participant chose one target
and indicated his/her choice by pressing a corresponding key. After a white
frame surrounding the chosen target was presented for 0.5 s, a picture
whose valence (neutral, positive, or negative) depended on the choice was
presented for 1.0 s. The picture valence was related to the choice through
conditional probabilities p(valence|choice), which are described inTable 1.
choose one square using a button box. We referred to the green
box as target 1 and the blue box as target 2. These two colors
were chosen following a previous experiment on human decision
making (Behrens et al., 2007). Target colors were not counterbal-
anced across participants, following Behrens et al. (2007). No time
limits for responses were imposed so that participants could not
use a simple strategy where they made no responses to avoid see-
ing negative pictures. The positions of the targets (left or right)
were randomized. After a white frame indicating the choice had
been presented for 0.5 s, a picture was presented for 1.0 s. The
picture category (negative, neutral, or positive) was related to
the choice through conditional probabilities p(valance|choice).
The probabilities were changed between blocks according to the
pre-determined schedule described in Table 1. The number of
trials included in one block ranged from 50 trials to 120 tri-
als. There were 7 blocks in total. We introduced breaks within
blocks rather than between blocks to avoid providing the par-
ticipants with a signal of the change of the probability, which
might be an artifact in examining the effect of learning. The same
schedule was used for all participants. We employed a common
schedule for three reasons: (1) to examine various combinations
of choice-picture contingencies with a restricted numbers of tri-
als; (2) to avoid situations where the change in contingency was
too difﬁcult to detect, which could occur if similar contingen-
cies followed (this was likely to occur if we randomized the order
of blocks); and (3) to make it possible to directly compare the
time courses for the choices and the goodness of ﬁt of mod-
els between participants. Each valence group contained ten pic-
tures taken from IAPS. Their normative valence/arousal ratings
were (mean± SD): 4.995± 0.160/2.372± 0.450 for the neutral
group, 7.743± 0.482/5.278± 0.618 for the positive group, and
2.735± 0.475/5.378± 0.553 for the negative group. The negative
and positive pictures were selected to be equidistant from the neu-
tral pictures in terms of valence and arousal. After the valence
category was determined depending on choice, a picture was ran-
domly selected with the constraint that the same picture was not
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Table 1 | Schedule of picture assignment probability and the participants’ choice preferences for each block.
Trial Target 1 Target 2 No. of participants
choosing target 1
No. of participants
choosing target 2
Preference across
participants
Neut:Pos:Neg Neut:Pos:Neg (p<0.05) (p<0.05)
1–50 0.7:0.2:0.1 0.7:0.1:0.2 5 0 1**
51–130 0.1:0.0:0.9 0.1:0.9:0.0 0 17 2**
131–210 0.1:0.7:0.2 0.2:0.7:0.1 0 15 2**
211–330 0.2:0.4:0.4 1.0:0.0:0.0 7 10 2**
331–420 0.2:0.0:0.8 0.0:0.2:0.8 6 10 n.s.
421–480 0.0:1.0:0.0 1.0:0.0:0.0 9 1 1**
481–600 0.7:0.1:0.2 0.7:0.2:0.1 6 11 n.s.
Each row represents one block. From the left column: trial range for each block, the probabilities for picture category for target 1 (second column) and target 2 (third
column), the number of participants showing a signiﬁcant preference to target 1 (fourth column) and target 2 (ﬁfth column) over 17 participants, and the preferred
target across all participants. Neut: neutral, Pos: positive, and Neg: negative pictures. **p<0.01.
shown in consecutive trials. The picture numbers that we used are
presented in Section “Appendix A.”
Participants were told that various pictures would be pre-
sented depending on the box they chose, and that there was
some relationship between their choice and the picture. They
were instructed to carefully look at the picture to answer ques-
tions about the scenes and people in the picture after the entire
experimental session had ﬁnished (not conducted). They were not
given instructions on more speciﬁc task structures or the goals of
the experiment. The stimuli were presented with a program writ-
ten using Presentation ver.14.1 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.).
After the entire experiment had been completed, participants
rated all pictures for valence on a scale from 1 (most unpleas-
ant) to 9 (most pleasant) in a paper-based questionnaire. They
were asked to rate how the images made them feel during the
decision-making experiment. The scale was converted for conve-
nience from −4 (most unpleasant) to 4 (most pleasant) in the
analysis. Participants sat comfortably in front of a monitor that
presented stimuli, and they used a button pad to indicate their
choices.
We administered the Japanese version of the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Sato and Yasuda, 2001) to
examine whether mood states inﬂuenced choice behavior. Partic-
ipants completed the PANAS twice before starting the experiment
and immediately after they had completed it. Participants were
instructed to “please indicate your emotion right now.”
MODEL-FREE ANALYSES
Choice preferences
To test whether there were signiﬁcant choice preferences during
each block, we submitted the number of choices for each target
and participant to the Pearson’s chi-square test (discarding the
ﬁrst 10 trials of each block).
Dependence of choice behavior on history
Tomeasure how the valences of previous pictures affected the next
choice, we computed empirical probability p(stay(t )|valance(t −
1)) or the probability of choosing the same target at trial t as at
the previous trial t − 1, given the picture valence at trial t − 1. The
effects of the picture valences were tested with ANOVA.
We also examined how more than one past picture affected
choice. Computing the conditional probability given more than
one previous picture involved the problem of sample size due to
the exponential growth of combinations. Therefore, we used a
linear regression analysis (ﬁlter analysis), following Sugrue et al.
(2004), Corrado et al. (2005), and assumed that the current choice
was inﬂuenced by a linear combination of recent choices and their
outcomes.With the index of valence j =Neut, Pos, Neg, we deﬁne
the picture history by rj(t ) such that rj(t ) takes 1 (−1) if a par-
ticipant chose target 1 (2) on trial t, and the resulting picture is
valence j, but rj(t ) takes 0 if the resulting picture is not valence j.
Choice history is also deﬁned by c(t ) such that c(t )= 1 if a partici-
pant chooses target 1, and c(t )=−1 if a participant chooses target
2 on trial t. With these quantities, the linear regression model is
given by
Lj(t ) =
M∑
i=1
kj(i)rj(t − i) +
M∑
i=1
h(i)c(t − i), (1)
where kj(i) and h(i) correspond to the regression coefﬁcients for
ith trials before for the picture history of valence j and for the
choice history. M is the length of choice-picture history (from the
current trial to the past trials) and we used M = 7. We optimized
the coefﬁcients, kj(i) and h(i), so that they minimized the sum of
squared errors between Lj(t ) and the choicesmade by participants:
Ej =
∑
t
{
Lj(t ) − c(t )
}2
. (2)
MODEL-BASED ANALYSES
Q-learning models
To model the participants’ choice behaviors, we employed the
Q-learning model, which is a standard reinforcement learning
model (Watkins and Dayan, 1992; Sutton and Barto, 1998). The
Q-learning model represents the estimated “value” of each action
(selecting one target) as Q-values. Let Qi(t ) denote the Q-value
for target i (i = 1,2) on trial t. The Q-values are updated accord-
ing to the action and the resulting outcome (the outcome in this
study corresponded to a picture valence). Let a(t )∈ {1,2} denote
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the target the participant chooses on trial t. If a(t )= i, then the
Q-value corresponding to the selected target is updated as
Qi(t + 1) = Qi(t ) + α (v(t ) − Qi(t )) , (3)
while the Q-value corresponding to the unselected target does not
change. Here, α is the learning rate that determines the degree
of the update, and v(t ) is the “reward value” for the picture pre-
sented during trial t, which is speciﬁed below. Given a Q-value set,
a choice is made according to the probability of choosing target 1,
which is given by a soft-max function:
P (a(t ) = 1) = exp (Q1(t ))
exp (Q1(t )) + exp (Q2(t )) , (4)
with P(a(t )= 2)= 1− P(a(t )= 1). Let us consider six variants of
the Q-learning models (models 1–6) and compare them based on
howwell they ﬁt the participants’ choice behaviors. Themodels are
divided into category- and rating-based models. The former uses
pre-determined valence categories (neutral, positive, andnegative)
to compute value v(t ), whereas the latter uses the participants’
valence ratings.
The category-based models (models 1–4) set v(t ) to v(t )= κP
if the picture valence on trial t is positive, v(t )= 0 if the picture
valence is neutral, and v(t )= κN if the picture valence is negative.
We set the value of the neutral picture to zero because the rela-
tive values of these three categories are most important. Because
we did not know the subjective value of each valence beforehand,
κP and κN are free parameters that should be adjusted based on
participants’ choice data. To examine the asymmetric effect of pos-
itive and negative valence, we included a model with symmetric
value parameters (κP =−κN , model 1) and a model that allows
the value parameters to be asymmetric (model 2).Where there was
asymmetry in the picture values, the next question was whether
both values for positive and negative valences inﬂuence choice
behavior or only one parameter of positive or negative valences
inﬂuences choice behavior. To answer this, we included a model
in which only negative pictures have an effect on choice behavior
(κP = 0,model 3), and amodel in which only a positive value have
an effect (κN = 0, model 4).
The rate-based models (models 5–6) use each participant’s
valence rating for individual pictures to compute v(t ). Denot-
ing the rating for the picture presented at trial t as rat-
ing(t )= [−4(most negative),..., 0 (neutral),..., 4 (most positive))],
we divide the rating value into negative and positive parts as rat-
ing(t )= rating+(t )+ rating−(t ). Again, we considered the sym-
metric value-weighting (v(t )=m·rating(t ); model 5) and asym-
metric value-weighting (v(t )=m+·rating+(t )+m−·rating−(t );
model 6), where m, m+ and m− are free parameters. To examine
how well our models ﬁt participants’ choice behaviors, we also
employed a biased random choice model (null model) that con-
stantly produces the same probability of choosing two targets with
the biases of the actual participants’ choices. The list of free para-
meters and the number of parameters for all models are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2 | List of model parameters.
Model Learning rate Reward value
of pictures
No. of
parameters (k )
1 α pos: κ, neut: 0, neg: −κ 2
2 α pos: κP , neut: 0, neg: κN 3
3 α pos: 0, neut: 0, neg: κN 2
4 α pos: κP , neut: 0, neg: 0 2
5 α m·rating 2
6 α m+·rating+, m−·rating− 3
Null model – – 1 (bias)
Models 1–4 are picture category-based models, which use valence category to
compute the reward value of pictures.Models 5–6 are rating-basedmodels,which
use the participants’ valence ratings. Null models have only one parameter for
choice bias.The entire set of models, except for the null model, has learning rate,
α, as a free parameter that determines the degree of update of the Q-values. To
compute the reward value of pictures, the category-based models have κs for
positive and/or negative pictures. The rating-based models have ms as a multi-
plicative factor for participants’ valence ratings. The number of free parameters
in each model is listed in the far right column.
Parameter ﬁtting
We adopted the maximum-likelihood approach to ﬁt the model
parameters to participants’ choice behaviors. If the participant’s
actual choice for the t th trial is a(t )= i, the likelihood is given by
P(a(t )= i), which is computed from the soft-max function given
above. The log-likelihood for the entire trial is given by
L =
T∑
t=1
ln P (a(t )) , (5)
where T denotes the total number of trials, which was 600 in our
experiment. We computed this log-likelihood by initializing the
Q-values at zero and updating the Q-values based on the actual
participants’ choice data.
We performed a grid search to ﬁnd the best parameter set, in
which we varied the parameters systematically in discrete steps,
and selected the parameter set that produced the highest log-
likelihood. We varied learning rate α within the range [0.05 1.5]
in increments of 0.05, value parameters κ , κP , and κN within the
range [−10 10] in increments of 0.2, and value-weighting para-
meters m, m+, and m− within the range [−10 10] in increments
of 0.2. To compare the goodness of ﬁt of the sevenmodels with the
best-ﬁt parameters, we computed Akaike’s information criterion
(AIC) given by
AIC = −2L + 2k, (6)
where k is the number of free parameters. Smaller AIC values
indicate better ﬁts. We computed another model selection crite-
rion, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), but we did not
ﬁnd quantitative differences (in relative values among models)
from the results with AIC. Thus, we only report the results with
AIC.
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3. RESULTS
We ﬁrst report the results of the model-free analysis, or the direct
analysis of the choice data and valence rating data for the stim-
ulus pictures. We then present the results obtained from the
model-based analysis.
VALENCE RATING
We ﬁrst examined the valence rating data to verify our valence
categories for the pictures used, where those scaled to −4 were the
most negative, those scaled to 0 were neutral, and those scaled to
4 were the most positive. The valence rating for the neutral group
(mean± SD over ten pictures) was −0.19± 0.38, which did not
signiﬁcantly differ from zero (p = 0.15, Wilcoxon’s signed-rank
test). The valence rating for the positive group was 2.66± 0.76,
and the valence rating for the negative group was −2.41± 0.74,
both of which signiﬁcantly differed from zero (p < 0.01). These
results indicate that the picture categories assigned to each picture
were valid. The absolute values for rating the positive and neg-
ative groups did not signiﬁcantly differ (p = 0.30, paired-sample
Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test), implying the valence symmetry of
our picture set. This symmetry is important when interpreting
the asymmetry in choice behavior in response to positive/negative
pictures, which will be discussed later.
CHOICE PREFERENCES
The participants’ choice preferences for each block are listed in the
right three columns of Table 1. Overall, the participants preferred
positive pictures over neutral pictures and neutral pictures over
negative pictures. For example, 5 participants indicated a signiﬁ-
cant preference for target 1, while no participants reported a pref-
erence for target 2 in the ﬁrst block (trials 1–50), where the prob-
ability for positive/negative pictures was slightly larger/smaller
for target 1. In the second block (trials 51–130), all participants
indicated a signiﬁcant preference for target 2, in which positive
pictures appeared with a probability of 0.9, while target 1 evoked
negative pictures with a probability of 0.9. There were blocks in
which preferences across participants were split, and no signiﬁ-
cant preferences across participants were observed (trials 331–420
and 481–600). This is possibly due to the combined effects of the
persistence of preferences for a previous block (carry-over effect)
and individual differences between the relative “reward values” of
three valences. In either case, this can be interpreted as participants
choosing hypothetical values, with positive> neutral> negative
pictures. We intend to strengthen this view with the model-based
analysis discussed later.
DEPENDENCE ON HISTORY
We examined how the valence of a previous picture affected sub-
sequent choices. Figure 2A shows the probability of repeating
(staying) an action conditioned on previous picture valences.
An ANOVA revealed that the main effect of the valence cate-
gory was signiﬁcant (F(2,32)= 23.97, p < 0.01). The probabil-
ity of staying was signiﬁcantly smaller after a negative picture
than after a neutral or positive picture, indicating that partic-
ipants tended to switch when negative pictures were presented
compared with when positive or neutral pictures were pre-
sented (p(stay|negative) vs. p(stay|positive) and p(stay|negative)
vs. p(stay|neutral); HSD = 0.123, α = 0.01, Tukey’s honestly sig-
niﬁcant difference test). The mean stay probability did not fall
below 0.5, even after a negative picture, implying that the par-
ticipants did not undertake the strategy of switching their choice
immediately after viewing a negative picture. This may be due to
the effects of positive or neutral pictures presented more than one
trial before.
We performed linear ﬁlter (regression) analysis to analyze the
inﬂuence of pictures presented more than one trial before. We
measured the extent of this inﬂuence by using ﬁtted regression
coefﬁcients.Figure 2Bplots the regression coefﬁcients (kj(i)) aver-
aged over all participants. The larger the absolute value of the
coefﬁcient, the larger the inﬂuence of the past trial’s picture valence
on the current choice. For positive and negative valences, the coef-
ﬁcients appeared to decrease exponentially from one trial before
to older trials. This tendency was consistent with reward-based
choice behaviors observed in monkey experiments (Sugrue et al.,
2004; Lau and Glimcher, 2005). This decay pattern suggests that
what affected the participants’ choices was not only pictures pre-
sented in the immediate past but also pictures presented a few
FIGURE 2 | Dependencies of choice behavior on history. (A) Empirical
probability of repeating an action (staying) given the valence of previous
pictures. (B) Mean regression coefﬁcients for the history of each picture
valence. The larger the absolute value of the coefﬁcient, the larger the
inﬂuence of the picture valence of the past trial on the current choice. Error
bars indicate standard error.
www.frontiersin.org October 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 311 | 5
Katahira et al. Decision-making based on emotional images
trials prior. Because there was large variability in the estimated
regression coefﬁcients due to small trial size (600 trials),we cannot
state more quantitative properties, such as how far back previous
trials inﬂuence current choice or whether the histories of nega-
tive pictures and positive pictures are different in the decay time
constants. A more thorough experiment using a larger number
of trials is required to clarify these points. The following model-
based analysis describes the mechanism responsible for the decay
pattern in history dependencies.
MODEL-BASED ANALYSIS OF CHOICE BEHAVIOR
Of particular interest in the present study was the “reward value”
of emotional pictures in terms of action selection. To measure
the value solely from choice data, we applied reinforcement learn-
ing models, which are established models for human and animal
learning in decision making (Daw and Doya, 2006; Corrado and
Doya, 2007).We compared six versions of themodel under various
assumptions. We used the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to
measure goodness of ﬁt, which includes a penalty that increases as
a function of the number of adjustable parameters. The adjustable
parameters for models 1–6 were learning rate, which determines
the degree of update of the value function for the selected target,
and the value parameters for the positive and negative valences
(Table 2). Figure 3A shows the difference in AIC relative to the
best model (model 2), which was a full model that allowed the
value parameters for positive and negative pictures to be asym-
metric. Model 2 yielded a signiﬁcantly better ﬁt than model 1
(p < 0.05, paired-sample Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test), in which
the value parameters were symmetric, indicating that the reward
values for positive and negative pictures were asymmetric.Model 2
was also signiﬁcantly better than model 3 (p < 0.05), in which
the positive value was zero, and model 4 (p < 0.01), in which
the negative value was zero. These results suggest that both the
valences of positive and negative pictures affected choice behav-
ior, while the effect was larger for negative pictures, which can be
conﬁrmed by checking the estimated value parameters for model
2 (Figure 3B).
Rating-basedmodels (models 5 and 6) directly use participants’
ratings for the valences of individual pictures to compute their
reward values. If the variability of subjective valences for individual
pictures is large and if the variable valence is directly related to the
action value, then the rating-based model would show a better ﬁt
than models based on pre-determined valence categories (models
1–4). However, even if the weights for positive and negative rat-
ings could have been asymmetric (model 6), no signiﬁcantly better
model ﬁt was obtained (p = 0.093) and the mean of AIC was even
larger. This suggests that the effect of picture valence variability
within the same category on choice behavior was not signiﬁcant.
To examine how well the models ﬁt participants’ choice behav-
ior, we also calculated an AIC for the biased random choice model
(null model) that constantly produced the same probability of two
targets being chosen with biases of the actual participants’ choices.
The AIC of the null model was signiﬁcantly larger (worse) than
that for all six models (p < 0.05 for model 4; ps< 0.01 for models
1, 2, 3, 5, and 6).
Next, we checked the learning process of the Q-learning model
and examined how close the model was to that of the participants.
Figure 4A shows a sample run of a simulation of model 2 with the
mean parameters over ﬁts for all participants. The model chose
targets based on the probability of targets being chosen, com-
puted from two Q-values, which were updated depending on the
resulting pictures. The valences of pictures given were dependent
upon the same schedule as those in the experiment (although
only 80 trials at the beginning are plotted). As seen in the top
panel of Figure 4A, the probability of choosing target 1, p(a = 1),
moved, increasing the probability of choosing a target from which
a positive picture (represented by a red bar) appeared, decreasing
the probability of choosing a target from which a negative pic-
ture (represented by a black bar) appeared (top panel). This was
accomplished by the updates of Q-values.
We applied choice-picture history regression analysis to the
choice data obtained from the simulation (Figure 4B) in the same
manner as the real data (Figure 2B). The simulations were con-
ducted 50 times for each parameter set and were ﬁtted to one
participant. As seenwhen comparing Figures 2B and 4B, although
the coefﬁcients differ quantitatively from the results of the exper-
iment, the qualitative properties (i.e., the exponential decay for
positive and negative pictures) were reproduced in the simulation.
FIGURE 3 | Results of the model-fitting using various Q-learning models.
(A) Goodnesses-of-ﬁt of various Q-learning models. Differences in AIC from
the best model (model 2) are plotted. **p <0.01; *p <0.05; difference from
the best model (model 2), Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test. (B) Estimated values
for the value parameters of the positive/negative pictures for model 2.
*p <0.05; **p <0.01; difference from zero.
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The mechanism for Q-learning to produce exponential decay in
the coefﬁcients can be explained as follows: if the value of a picture
after a target is chosen is larger than the current Q-value of the
target, the Q-value increases and the probability of choosing the
target increases. Thus, if the current Q-value is below zero, the
probability of choosing the target increases, even if the value of
the picture is zero (as was the case for the neutral picture in the
current model setting). In contrast, the probability of choosing
the target decreases if the value of the picture is smaller than the
current Q-value. Suppose a positive picture appearing after target
1 was chosen m-trial before. This would increase the probability
of target 1 being chosen again and thus would increase the regres-
sion coefﬁcient for the m-trial before. The effect on the current
Q-value decreases by a factor that is proportional to 1-(learning
rate) as we go back one trial (m + 1-trial before; see Appendix
B for more details). The similarity between the dependence on
history of the experimental results (Figure 2B) and simulation
with the Q-learningmodel (Figure 4B) implies that similar mech-
anisms for history dependencewith theQ-learningmodel underlie
participants’ choice behavior.
MOOD EFFECTS
To evaluate the effects of participants’ moods prior to and fol-
lowing the experiment, we examined the positive and negative
scores calculated from the PANAS that were completed by the
participants before and immediately after the experiment. The
positive score signiﬁcantly decreased from the pre-experiment
to the post-experiment (pre: 24.47± 6.00, post: 19.53± 5.69;
t (16)= 4.90, p < 0.01), while the negative scores exhibited
a tendency to increase (pre: 14.59± 6.89, post: 17.29± 5.85;
t (16)= 2.01, p = 0.061). The correlation coefﬁcients of mood
scores (pre-experiment, post-experiment, and their differences)
and the estimated parameters in the best model (model 2) are
summarized in Table 3. Although no signiﬁcant correlations were
found, the positive mood score (post-experiment) tended to neg-
atively correlate with the value of positive pictures, κP (r =−0.43,
p = 0.082). In addition, the change in the negative mood score
also tended to positively correlate with the value of positive pic-
tures (r = 0.42,p = 0.091). These tendenciesmay imply that either
the participants who feel the positive picturesmore positively tend
to show a change toward negative mood when exposed to negative
pictures, or they show that changing to a negativemood causes the
participants to seek positive pictures, thus increasing the estimated
reward value of positive pictures. We should note that the sensi-
tivity to detect a correlation was relatively low due to the relatively
small number of participants (n = 17; for p ≤ 0.05 and df = 15,
the correlation coefﬁcient must be r ≥ 0.482). A replication of our
results with a larger number of participants is needed in the future.
4. DISCUSSION
Using a stochastic two-alternative choice task paradigm, we inves-
tigated how the valence of emotional pictures was mapped onto
reward values that determined the tendency toward subsequent
choices. The results from analyzing the block-wise preferences
FIGURE 4 | Simulation of the experiment with the Q-learning
model (model 2). (A) An example of single run from trials 1 to 80.
Parameters were set to the mean of the ﬁtted parameters (α =0.62,
κP =0.75, κN =−2.19). (B) Mean regression coefﬁcients obtained from a
simulation of 50 runs of model 2 with a parameter set ﬁtted to each
participant.
Table 3 | Correlation coefficients between estimated model parameters (for model 2) and mood scores (pre-experiment, post-experiment, and
differences of them).
Model parameter Positive mood score Negative mood score
Pre Post Post-pre Pre Post Post-pre
Learning rate, α 0.14 0.13 −0.03 −0.28 −0.32 0.01
Positive picture value, κP −0.21 −0.43 (0.082) −0.29 −0.16 0.21 0.42 (0.091)
Negative picture value, κN −0.32 −0.15 0.26 0.04 −0.21 −0.28
All of the correlations were non-signiﬁcant (all p>0.05). Only p-values where p<0.1 are shown in parentheses.
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and ﬁtting the value parameters in reinforcement learning models
suggest that reward values increase fromnegative to neutral to pos-
itive pictures. The estimated values for the positive pictures were
signiﬁcantly positive relative to that of neutral pictures, and the
values for negative pictures were signiﬁcantly more negative than
neutral pictures. These results suggests that positive pictures act
as approaching stimuli, and that negative pictures act as aversive
stimuli. The participants were only instructed to look at the pic-
tures to answer questions about portrayed scenes or people after
the experiment, and no instructions were given concerning avoid-
ance of negative pictures or attempting to maximize the time they
observed thepositive pictures. In addition,unlike decision-making
tasks inmanyprevious studies, task performancewas not related to
actual rewards for participating in the experiment. All participants
were volunteers unpaid for participating in the experiment. In light
of this, our ﬁndings suggest that emotional pictures themselves can
be“internal rewards”that have value for humans. Furthermore, the
same picture was presented many times in our experiment (each
picture was presented 20 times on average.) Although the time
course of values was not examined in this study, signiﬁcant prefer-
ences across the entire experiment implied the values of pictures
were resistant to repetition. This property is reminiscent of exper-
iments demonstrating that the relative magnitudes of the startle
reﬂex to emotional pictures were relatively uninﬂuenced by repet-
itive presentations compared with other physiological measures
(Bradley et al., 1993).
Participants in free-viewing experiments using emotional pic-
tures tended to spend as much time looking at negative as positive
pictures, which was more time than spent on neutral pictures
(Hamm et al., 1997). This indicates that negative pictures were
not aversive stimuli in the free-viewing task. This seemingly con-
tradictory difference from our results can be explained as follows:
a crucial difference is that negative pictures were already pre-
sented to participants before they took action in the free-viewing
experiment, while in our experiment, the pictures were presented
depending on actions preceding the presentation. After a negative
event has already happened, an adaptive strategy in a natural envi-
ronment is to investigate what happened and to consider how one
should act next. Thus, people may take considerable time looking
at negative pictures. This may account for the results from free-
viewing tasks. In contrast, when the probability of occurrence of
negative events can be reduced if one takes some action, an adap-
tive strategy is to take such action. This corresponds with our
experiment.
We found that the models assuming value asymmetry (mod-
els 2 and 6) between positive and negative pictures ﬁt the choice
data better than the value-symmetric models (models 1 and 5).
The magnitude of the estimated value parameters was larger for
negative pictures than for those that were positive. It is worth
noting that the normative valence ratings for picture sets used
were symmetrical between the positive and negative categories. In
addition, no signiﬁcant asymmetry was found in the valence rat-
ings by our participants. It is notable that they were asked to rate
the valence of how the images made them feel in the experiment
rather than the valence depicted in the images. This implies that
the positive and negative pictures had equivalent values in terms
of absolute valence and what was experienced by participants.
Nonetheless, the estimated value yielded from the choice behavior
results indicated that avoiding negative events was more relevant
than approaching positive events. This tendency may be adap-
tive in natural environments. Speciﬁcally, when both a negative
and a positive event are likely to occur, avoiding negative events
likely yields better consequences for survival than approaching
positive events. This kind of asymmetry is known in the eco-
nomic literature to be asymmetry between gain and loss, which
has been explained by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Although this may only be a superﬁcial similarity, it would
provide an opportunity to enable the commonality and difference
in mechanisms underlying emotional event-based and economic
choices to be studied.
For the calculation methods of the reward value of pictures, we
compared the category-based models that used pre-determined
valence categories and the rating-based models that used the indi-
vidual valence ratings.We observed that the category-basedmodel
(model 2) yielded better performance than the rating-basedmodel
(model 6), although the difference did not reach signiﬁcance
(p = 0.092). This is perhaps a counterintuitive result, given that the
rating-based model can include the between-subject and within-
subject variability of how participants feel for individual pictures.
A possible reason for this is that the variability of picture valences
within categories is small, and the variability of the rated valence
serves as noise rather than a signal that indicates the model of the
true reward value of the pictures. When the experienced valences
were relatively uniformwithin the same category, a bias towarddis-
tributing the rating more than the true subjective valences might
occur in the participants.However,we cannot exclude the possibil-
ity that it was some other feature that differed between categories
that predicted choice behavior, not picture valence.
Because we focused on the valence of pictures, our picture sets
were not distributed along another other emotional dimensions,
such as:, i.e., arousal. Thus, our experiment did not allow us to
analyze what effect the arousal level of the stimuli had on decision
making. The arousal level of stimuli has been reported to affect
cognition in memory and attention, possibly through the amyg-
dala function of amygdala (Kensinger andCorkin, 2004;Anderson
et al., 2006). Thus, the arousal of stimuli probably affects learning
in decision-making tasks. It would be interesting future work to
incorporate the effect of arousal into the reinforcement learning
model. One possible effect is to modulate the learning rate, which
was assumed to be constant in our model.
The computational processes involved in our experimental par-
adigm and the models used were relatively simple in the context
of economic decision making. The two important computational
processes are the habitual and goal-directed mechanisms (Daw
et al., 2005). Thehabitualmechanismrepresents action-value asso-
ciation and is described by “model-free” reinforcement learning
methods. Here, “model-free” refers to the assumption that the
model does not include a state transition in the environment,
which should not be confused with the “model-free analysis”
conducted in the present study. The goal-directed mechanism
represents action-outcome and outcome-value associations and
is described by the model-based reinforcement learning meth-
ods, which explicitly represent the action-outcome transitions. In
our experiment, because the trials were mutually independent in
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our task paradigm (i.e., the past choice does not affect future
outcomes), the habitual mechanism is sufﬁcient. In fact, all the
models used in the present study belong to the model-free rein-
forcement learning method class. Investigating how emotional
events affect goal-directed controllers would be a beneﬁcial avenue
for future research. In this direction, Pezzulo and Rigoli (2011)
recently proposed a novel model that includes a prospection abil-
ity for anticipating future motivational and emotional states in
utility assignments (i.e., the model considers what emotion will
be experienced after a speciﬁc choice). It would be interesting to
generalize our paradigm using emotional pictures to a paradigm
which needs such prospection ability and to examine how Pez-
zulo and Rigoli’s model predicts choice behavior. Motivation is
another important component in decision making, especially in
assigning speciﬁc utilities to outcomes (e.g., if a decision-maker is
hungry, he will assign high utility to food, whereas if he is thirsty,
he will assign high utility to drink). Because our model does not
include the motivational state, it may be interesting to see how
motivational state inﬂuences the valuation of emotional pictures.
For example, wemay expect neutral pictures to have high utility in
the context of negative pictures frequently appearing, which tend
to disgust participants.
Weobserved that the reinforcement learningmodel reproduced
the participants’ actual behavior with regards to the inﬂuence
that choice-picture history had on current choices (Figure 4B).
This result suggests that human choice behavior based on emo-
tional pictures may use similar computational principles with
the reinforcement learning model; the action value (Q-value)
for each target is updated based on “reward-prediction error”
(i.e., the actual reward value minus the expected reward). In
the present study, the reward corresponds to the reward value
of emotional pictures and the expected reward corresponds to
the action value. Functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) studies
using monetary rewards have suggested that several distinct brain
regions encode reward-prediction error or action values (for a
review, see O’Doherty et al., 2007). Also, the reward-prediction
error is reﬂected in an event-related potential (ERP) measured by
electroencephalogram (EEG; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Ichikawa
et al., 2010). By measuring the brain response using fMRI or
EEG during emotional picture tasks, as in the present study,
one could ﬁnd the similarities and differences in processing of
emotional pictures and monetary reward. In addition, it would
be interesting to observe how prediction error or action val-
ues in the reinforcement learning model co-vary with peripheral
physiological measurements, including skin conductance, heart
rate, facial electromyographs (EMG), and blink magnitude, which
have been used for measuring reactions to emotional stimuli
(e.g., Lang, 1995; Bradley et al., 2001). The relationship between
peripheral autonomic activities and decision-making based on
monetary rewards has recently been investigated (Ohira et al.,
2010). One interesting future direction would be to examine
whether responses to emotional content in choice outcomes facil-
itate or interfere with autonomic activities in decision-making
processes. These kinds of studies would link a great deal of knowl-
edge from emotion science with decision-making theory and
research.
One remaining question is what aspect of emotion drives the
results reported in the present study. Is it the emotion experi-
enced by the participants upon viewing the images, or is it the
emotional valence of the images perceived? As we did not instruct
the participants to respond to the emotional content, the emotion
experienced by participants after viewing the images likely drives
our ﬁndings. Measuring peripheral autonomic activities in our
framework will also help clarify this point.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
The IAPS slide numbers we used were 2411, 5740, 7004, 7217, 7491, 2840, 7010, 7175, 7500, and 7950 for the neutral group; 1440, 2156,
5199, 5910, 8190, 1710, 2347, 4614, 5833, and 7502 for the positive group; and 1301, 3230, 9041, 9295, 9419, 1271, 6231, 9421, 9530,
and 9610 for the negative group.
APPENDIX B
Here, we discuss how the inﬂuences of past positive/negative pictures on current choice decay for the Q-learning model. We consider
the situation where the model chooses target i for both the m-trial before and m + 1-trial before from trial t. From the update rule of
the Q-value (equation 3), Qi is updated from trial t − (m + 1) to t −m as
Qi(t − m) = (1 − α)Qi (t − (m + 1)) + α v (t − (m + 1)) .
Then, the update from t −m to t −m + 1 is computed as
Qi(t − m + 1) = (1 − α)Qi(t − m) + α v(t − m)
= (1 − α) [(1 − α)Qi (t − (m − 1)) + αv (t − (m + 1))] + αv(t − m)
= (1 − α)2Qi (t − (m − 1)) + (1 − α)αv (t − (m + 1)) + αv(t − m).
We ﬁnd from the last equation that the effect of the picture value at trial t − (m + 1) is smaller than that at trial t −m by a factor of
1−α. In addition, there is another case where themodel chooses another target at trial t −m. For this, the effect of value v(t − (m + 1))
remains without being diminished. Because the regression coefﬁcient for m + 1 trials before includes both cases, the decay factor in the
regression coefﬁcient is larger than 1−α.
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